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For now we see through a glass, darkly...
-1 Corinthians 13:12
Introduction
In 1984 I was a 22-year-old college student with a grade point
average of 4.0, and I really wanted to do something with my life.
One night someone broke into my apartment, put a knife to my
throat and raped me.
During my ordeal, some of my determination took an urgent new
direction. I studied every single detail on the rapist's face. I looked
at his hairline; I looked for scars, for tattoos, for anything that
would help me identify him. When and if I survived the attack, I
was going to make sure that he was put in prison and he was going
to rot.
When I went to the police department later that day, I worked on a
composite sketch to the very best of my ability. I looked through
hundreds of noses and eyes and eyebrows and hairlines and nostrils
and lips. Several days later, looking at a series of police photos, I
identified my attacker. I knew this was the man. I was completely
confident. I was sure.
I picked the same man in a lineup. Again, I was sure. I knew it. I
had picked the right guy, and he was going to go to jail. If there
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002; B.A.
Stanford University, 1998. I would like to thank Professor Cheryl Hanna, Noel Bartsch,
and Ryan Hassanein for their editorial suggestions and assistance with this Note.
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was a possibility of a death sentence, I wanted him to die. I wanted
to flip the switch.
When the case went to trial in 1986, I stood up on the stand, put my
hand on the Bible and swore to tell the truth. Based on my
testimony, Ronald Junior Cotton was sentenced to prison for life.
It was the happiest day of my life because I could begin to put it all
behind me.
In 1987, the case was retried because an appellate court had
overturned Ronald Cotton's conviction. During a pretrial hearing,
I learned that another man had supposedly claimed to be my
attacker and was bragging about it in the same prison wing where
Ronald Cotton was being held. This man, Bobby Poole, was
brought into court, and I was asked, "Ms. Thompson, have you ever
seen this man?" I answered: "I have never seen him in my life. I
have no idea who he is."
Ronald Cotton was sentenced again to two life sentences. Ronald
Cotton was never going to see light; he was never going to get out;
he was never going to hurt another woman; he was never going to
rape another woman. In 1995, 11 years after I had first identified
Ronald Cotton, I was asked to provide a blood sample so that
DNA tests could be run on evidence from the rape. I agreed
because I knew that Ronald Cotton had raped me and DNA was
only going to confirm that. The test would allow me to move on
once and for all.
I will never forget the day I learned about the DNA results. I was
standing in my kitchen when the detective and the district attorney
visited. They were good and decent people who were trying to do
their jobs-as I had done mine, as anyone would try to do the right
thing. They told me: "Ronald Cotton didn't rape you. It was
Bobby Poole."
The man I was so sure I had never seen in my life was the man who
was inches from my throat, who raped me, who hurt me, who took
my spirit away, who robbed me of my soul. And the man I had
identified so emphatically on so many occasions was absolutely
innocent.
The lengthy passage quoted above provides merely one of many
examples of those who have been wrongfully convicted on the basis
of inaccurate eyewitness testimony.2 In fact, "incorrect eyewitness
identifications appear to be the leading cause of wrongful criminal
1. Jennifer Thompson, Editorial, I Was Certain, but I Was Wrong, N.Y. TIMES, June
18,2000, § 4, at 15.
2. Professor Donald Judges has written an article that provides a number of examples
of defendants convicted of horrible crimes, largely on the basis of eyewitness testimony,
who later had their convictions reversed when DNA tests proved that the defendants
could not have committed the crimes for which they were convicted. Donald P. Judges,
Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231,231-32 (2000).
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convictions in the American legal system. '3  In a recent study,
subjects watched a staged purse-snatching on television and had a
clear view of the criminal's face.4 Only 14% of the subjects correctly
chose the purse-snatcher out of a six person lineup.5 These witnesses,
provided with a clear view of the criminal, performed worse than if
they had guessed at random!
Lineups are a standard control measure in eyewitness
identifications.6 Over 75,000 people become criminal suspects based
on eyewitness identifications each year.7  They are typically
conducted in one of two ways. The standard or simultaneous lineup
presents a number of "suspects" at the same time and a witness or
victim chooses from those persons presented. Alternatively, a
sequential lineup presents the "suspects" one at a time and asks the
witness to decide at the time of presentation whether the subject
matches his or her memory of the criminal.8 Both lineup forms can be
performed with live persQns or with photographs.
The topic of eyewitness identification and specifically, lineup
procedure, has received a great deal of attention recently. It has been
the subject of numerous court decisions,9 scholarly and popular
articles, 0 a Department of Justice report,' and even an episode of
"All Things Considered" on National Public Radio.1 2  Although
eyewitness identification procedures present a number of problems in
general, there is ample research suggesting that simultaneous line-ups
are prone to more error than sequential line-ups. 3 Despite the
3. John C. Brigham & Jeffrey E. Pfeifer, Evaluating the Fairness of Lineups, in
ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 201 (David F. Ross et al. eds., 1994) (citing C.R. Huff et
al., Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongfil Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME &
DELINQ. 518-44 (1986); U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); P.M. WALL, EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL CASES (1965)).




7. Atul Gawande, Under Suspicion, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 8,2001, at 50.
8. Gary L. Wells et al., Recommendations for Properly Conducted Lineup
Identification Tasks [hereinafter Recommendations], in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY,
supra note 3, at 223, 240. Lineups can also be conducted either with live subjects or by
having the witness look through a series of photographs, but each of these scenarios can
occur either sequentially or concurrently.
9. See, e.g., infra notes 130-131 and 139-140 and accompanying text.
10. See supra note 7 and infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 127-129 and accompanying text.
12. All Things Considered: Interview with Professor Rod Lindsay on New Techniques
for Witnesses to Identify Possible Suspects (National Public Radio, July 23, 2001), available
at 2001 WL 9435658.
13. PETER B. AINSWORTH, PSYCHOLOGY, LAW AND EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 93
(Graham Davies & Ray Bull eds., 1998) [hereinafter AINSWORTH] (citing BRIAN L.
CUTLER & STEPHEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS,
March 2002]
greater accuracy associated with sequential line-ups, most law
enforcement agencies do not utilize sequential lineups. 4 In addition,
the United States Supreme Court (the "Court") has never held that
the Due Process clause requires law enforcement agencies to use
sequential line-up procedures rather than simultaneous line-up
procedures. The Court's failure to so hold is attributable to both (1) a
hesitancy to rely on social science research and (2) a reluctance to
perceive the Due Process clause as a normative mandate.
This Note argues that the Due Process clause requires law
enforcement agents to employ, exclusively, the sequential lineup
procedure. Part I of this Note presents evidence on the merits of
sequential lineups drawn from a wide range of studies. Part II
explores the relationship between science and the law and discusses
why courts should not hesitate to rely on the social science research in
the field of eyewitness identification. Part III traces both a moral and
an historical basis for a normative notion of Due Process. Part IV
concludes that courts should adopt a normative notion of Due
Process and thereby, require law enforcement agencies to use
sequential line-ups.
I. Eyewitness Identification
During the 1970's, a number of researchers turned their sights to
eyewitness testimony with an eye toward improving eyewitness
accuracy. This attention was deserved: a 1975 Rand Corporation
study found that "the principal determinant of whether or not a case
is solved is the completeness and accuracy of the eyewitness
accounts."' 5 Many law enforcement officials share this conviction. 6
In addition, the Devlin Report, an exhaustive report on identification
evidence in the United Kingdom, found nearly a 75% conviction rate
when eyewitness testimony constituted the only evidence. 7 One-half
of these cases involved testimony by only one witness.' P The drafters
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW (1995) [hereinafter MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION]; D.M.
Thompson, Eyewitness Testimony and Identification Tests, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
POLICING (N. Brewer & C. Wilson eds., 1995)).
14. Gawande, supra note 7, at 50-51.
15. RAND CORP., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (1975), cited in
AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 98.
16. Glenn S. Sanders, On Increasing the Usefulness of Eyewitness Research, 10 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 333,334 (1986).
17. Lord Devlin, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department of the
Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal Cases (London, 1976)
[hereinafter Devlin Rpt.], cited in AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 63.
18. Id. Elizabeth Loftus conducted a study that supports these findings in which she
demonstrated that the addition of an eyewitness identification to circumstantial evidence
pointing to a suspect increased the percentage of subjects voting to convict from 18% to
72%. ELIZABETH F. LOFFUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 9-10 (1979) (citing Elizabeth
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of the Devlin Report recommended that "cases where identification
was the only evidence against an accused should not normally
proceed."19 Nevertheless, the report concluded that the gap between
psychological research of the day and the practical necessities of the
criminal justice system precluded them from stating that
psychological research was "sufficiently widely accepted or tailored to
the needs of the judicial process to become the basis for procedural
change."2 Today, however, "the scientific community is unanimous
in finding that sequential lineups are fairer and result in more
accurate identification.,
21
A. Overwhelming Evidence of Inaccuracy
In their oft-cited book, Mistaken Identification, Brian Cutler and
Stephen Penrod conclude that eyewitnesses frequently make mistakes
in their identifications.2 A number of studies conducted since the
1970's have confirmed this inaccuracy. One of the more striking
studies suggests that over 40% of wrongful convictions were for
murder' and that about half of those wrongfully convicted spent
between one and six years in prison.24 That same study indicates that
eyewitness misidentification was the most frequent kind of error,
occurring in over 50% of the surveyed cases." Considering the severe
punishment for such crimes, inaccuracies that account for such
convictions are intolerable. The Anglo-American system of justice
has long recognized the principle that "it is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."26
Other research suggests further problems with lineup
procedures. While investigating photographic identification
procedures, Davies, Shepherd, and Ellis demonstrated that "the more
photographs a witness examines, the more likely it is that he or she
will pick out the wrong person."27 In addition, one survey suggests
Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, [1974] 8 PSYCHOL. TODAY
116-19). Even with additional information showing that the eyewitness was legally blind
and not wearing his glasses at the time of the events, 68% of subjects still voted to convict!
Id
19. Devlin Rpt. (emphasis added), cited in AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 78.
20. Devlin Rpt. 71, cited in AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 79.
21. In re Investigation of Thomas, 733 N.Y.S.2d 591,595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
22. MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION, supra note 13, at 10-12.
23. Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent. Wrongful Conviction and the Criminal
Justice System, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283,287 (1988).
24. Id. at 290.
25. Id. at 289. The study does, however, continue to state that most wrongful
convictions involve a number of factors.
26. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
27. AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 83 (citing G.M. Davies et al., Effects of Interpolated
Mugshot Exposure on Accuracy of Eyewitness Identification, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
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"that witnesses can quite easily have their memories altered, often
without their being aware of the fact." Another study concludes that
the "chances that a member of the public will correctly identify a
person from a facial reconstruction are almost negligible." 9
Elizabeth Loftus has even demonstrated that the mere wording
of questions affects a witness's response about a particular situation. N
This effect creates a real threat of suggestiveness during pre-trial line-
ups31 because the Federal Rules of Evidence only prohibit leading
questions at trial.2 Other research indicates that once witnesses select
a suspect, they rarely reconsider the accuracy of the initial
identification.3 Moreover, Elizabeth Luus & Gary Wells recently
found little correlation between the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification and the eyewitness's confidence in her selection.' More
than any other piece of research, this finding indicates a need for
courts to take heed of current developments in social psychological
research and proceed cautiously in accepting eyewitness testimony.
A sampling of New York police officers found that not a single
officer indicated an awareness of the extensive published research on
eyewitness identification, even though over 90% of the sample spoke
about experiences with unreliable eyewitness testimony. 5 Just as
important is the finding that many jurors "tend to rely on factors that
are not diagnostic of eyewitness accuracy... [and] tend to
232-37 (1979); H.D. Ellis et al., Identification From a Computer-driven Retrieval System
Compared With a Traditional Mugshot Album Search: A New Tool For Police
Investigations, 32 ERGONOMICS 167-77 (1989)).
28. AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 62.
29. R.H. Logie et al., Face Recognition: Pose and Ecological Validity, 1 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 53-69 (1987).
30. LOFTUS, supra note 18, at 94-97.
31. PETER B. AINSWORTH, PSYCHOLOGY AND POLICING IN A CHANGING WORLD
20-26 (1995).
32. FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
33. J.C. Brigham & D.L. Cairns, The Effect of Mugshot Inspections on Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1394-1410 (1988); MISTAKEN
IDENTIFICATION, supra note 13, at 107. See also LOFTUS, supra note 18, at 55 (noting that
"[p]ostevent information can not only enhance existing memories but also change a
witness's memory and even cause nonexistent details to become incorporated into a
previously acquired memory"). In United States v. Wade, the Court noted that" '[i]t is a
matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out the accused at the line-
up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on, so that in practice the issue of identity
may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined
there and then, before the trial."' 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (quoting Williams &
Hammelmann, Identification Parades, Part 1, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479,482).
34. C.A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, Eyewitness Identification Confidence, in
ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 3,'at 348,358-59.
35. Sanders, supra note 16, at 334. Sanders notes that the officers "cited numerous
examples of abundant and diverse eyewitness errors" of the same types as those
independently observed in psychological experiments focusing on this issue.
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overestimate eyewitness accuracy" even though they know of the
potential for inaccuracies in eyewitness testimony.36 Taken together,
these studies demonstrate the fallibility of the human mind in the
context of eyewitness identification, and cast a shadow of doubt over
trials that rely on eyewitness testimony.
B. Sequential Lineup Research
Gary Wells' pioneering work on eyewitness identification during
the mid-1970s and early 1980s serves as the foundation for today's
research. In a recent article, Wells and his co-author noted that the
"account one gets from an eyewitness depends very much on the
methods used to solicit the information."' Although the authors are
"not yet prepared to recommend that all lineups be conducted
sequentially," they stated that, "in general, we endorse the
sequential line-up procedure."
In a 1995 article with fellow Professor Eric Seelau, Wells
concluded that "a sequential procedure produces fewer false
identifications than does a simultaneous procedure with little or no
decrease in rates of accurate identification."+ Wells and Seelau posit
that the improved accuracy results from the shift from comparisons
between lineup members to a comparison between the witness's
memory and the lineup members.4 Another researcher has suggested
36. Jennifer L. Devenport, Stephen D. Penrod, & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y,
& L. 338,353 (1997).
37. Recommendations, supra note 8, at 223. See also supra note 30 and accompanying
text.
38. Id. at 241. The authors did not recommend the use of sequential lineups across the
board because the potential inability to keep the lineup administrator blind to the identity
of the actual suspect might increase the likelihood that he would communicate the identity
of the suspect to the eyewitness. Id. See also Russell Contreras, More Courts Let Experts
Debunk Witness Accounts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2001, at B1 (quoting a psychologist who
testifies frequently about memory as saying that "[d]one incorrectly, sequential lineups
make it easier for police to lead eyewitnesses toward a particular suspect").
39. Recommendations, supra note 8, at 241.
40. Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification: Psychological Research
and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y. & L. 765, 772 (1995) (citing Brian
L. Cutler & Stephen D. Penrod, Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification:
Lineup Construction and Presentation, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 281-90 (1988); R.C.L.
Linsday et al., Sequential Lineup Presentation: Technique Matters, 76 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 741-45 (1991); R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Biased Lineups: Sequential Presentation
Reduces the Problem, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 796-802 (1991); R.C.L. Lindsay & Gary L.
Wells, Improving Eyewitness Identifications From Lineups: Simultaneous Versus
Sequential Lineup Presentation, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 556-64 (1985); S.L. Sporer,
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy, Confidence, and Decision Times in Simultaneous and
Sequential Lineups, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 22-33 (1993)).
41. Id. Researchers refer to witnesses' practice of comparing the members in a
traditional lineup against each other rather than against their own memories as the
March 2002]
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that sequential lineups reduce the number of inaccurate
identifications because they "encourage witnesses to make absolute
judgments ... instead of comparative or relative judgments."42
Some academics argue that lineups need not be perfect because
eyewitness identifications serve a diagnostic function." This
argument is problematic, however, because research shows "that
innocent suspects are far more likely to be identified in otherwise fair
target-absent lineups, when they are only more similar to the real
perpetrator than the foils." In fact, studies show the
misidentification rate for blank lineups (containing only subjects
known to be innocent) to be extremely high, ranging anywhere from
81-93%." The basis for this type of misidentification may lie in the
fact that witnesses view lineups as problems to be solved46 and believe
that they must choose at least one from the lineup.47 A sequential
lineup would help to alleviate this problem in that it would prevent
the witness from making comparative judgements.8
H. Science and the Law
Before holding that Due Process requires law enforcement
agencies to utilize sequential lineup procedures, the Court must be
willing to acknowledge the reliability of the social scientific research
in this area.
A. Science in the Court
Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to use scientific
evidence in trials. Professor David Faigman notes the fundamental
"relative judgment process." For a discussion of the research on the relative judgment
process, see id. at 772-73.
42. Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony about Eyewitness Memory, 1
PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 909, 918 (1995) (citations omitted).
43. D. Navon, How Critical is the Accuracy of an Eyewitness Memory: Another Look
at the Issue of Lineup Diagnostics, 75 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 506-10 (1990), cited in Willem
A. Wagenaar, Anchored Narratives: a Theory of Judicial Reasoning, and its Consequences
[hereinafter Anchored Narratives], in PSYCHOLOGY, LAW, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 267, 277-78 (Graham
Davies et al. eds., 1996).
44. Wagenaar, W.A., The Forensic Context of Lineup Tests (1993) cited in Anchored
Narratives, supra note 43, at 277.
45. ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 3, at 80, 85 (citations omitted).
46. J. Don Read, Understanding Bystander Misidentifications: The Role of Familiarity
and Contextual Knowledge, in ADULT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY, supra note 3, at 56,77.
47. Id.
48. Law enforcement agencies that do not adopt a sequential lineup procedure might
temper this problem by informing witnesses that the lineup does not necessarily include a
suspect, thereby limiting the witness's impulse simply to choose the best fit among the
choices. See generally Recommendations, supra note 8, at 236-37.
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tension between scientific and legal inquiries and explains its basis in
terms of the two systems' different standards for acceptable
confidence and uncertainty. 9 As early as 1923, the D.C. Court of
Appeals set the tone for the admissibility of expert testimony in Frye
v. U.S. ' when it found scientific expert testimony to be admissible
only if based on techniques that were "generally accepted" as reliable
in the scientific field as to which the expert is testifying.5 This
stringent standard excluded a great deal of testimony based on
methodologies whose value was subject to debate in the relevant
scientific field.' In 1993, the Court, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., held that the Federal Rules of Evidence
supersede the Frye standard in federal criminal trials.53 Further, the
Court held that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the issue of
admissibility turns on whether the trial judge finds the expert
testimony both reliable and relevant as a matter of law.' Today, the
admissibility of expert testimony remains an issue of law subject to
abuse-of-discretion review.55 For social science research in this area
to be admitted in trial, it would have to satisfy the Daubert standard
for admissibility.
B. The Social Sciences and the Law
One survey of case-law and literature places the first use of a
psychologist as a witness in a 1931 Arkansas case, Criglow v. State.6
That case ironically involved a claim of mistaken identity.57 The
Criglow court excluded the expert testimony on the ground that "one
man as well as another might form an opinion" as to the witnesses'
claims of mistaken identification. The Criglow decision
demonstrates a fear that juries will accept so-called "expert"
49. DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY 66-70 (1999) [hereinafter FAIGMAN].
50. 293 F. 1013 (1923).
51. Id. at 1014.
52. See, e.g., U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 328 (1998) (noting that "under the regime
established by Frye v. United States, scientific evidence was inadmissible unless it met a
stringent 'general acceptance' test"); David E. Bernstein, Frye, Frye Again: The Past,
Present, and Future of the General Acceptance Test, 41 JURIMETRICS J. 385, 390 (2001);
Paul B. Tyler, The Kelly-Frye "General Acceptance" Standard Remains the Rule for
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: People v. Leahy, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1274, 1288-
91 (1995) (discussing the exclusion of DNA evidence in the early 1990's under California's
application of the Frye test).
53. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579,589 (1993).
54. Id. at 597.
55. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,143 (1997).
56. Criglow v. State, 36 S.W.2d 400 (Ark. 1931).
57. AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 156-57.
58. Criglow, 36 S.W.2d at 401.
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testimony without a critical eye and accords with the old Frye
standard governing the admissibility of scientific evidence. 9
Brown v. Bd. of Educ.' is cited as the beginning of the Court's
willingness to rely on social science evidence "with any regularity."6
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp marks this change as revolutionary for
its abandonment of "a longstanding legal tradition of refusing to give
explicit credit to intellectual sources from outside lawyers'
jurisprudence."62 Hovenkamp discounts the weight others place on
Justice Brandeis's use of non-statutory information in the dissent in
Adams v. Tanner,63 but Brandeis's role in leading the Court into the
age of scientific progress cannot be overstated. In Muller v. Oregon,"
a post-Lochner Court upheld workplace regulations for women at
least partially on the basis of scientific evidence.6 The Court relied in
part on a lengthy brief, filed by future Justice Brandeis, that
marshaled statistical and scientific evidence in support of the
proposition that long working hours hurt women.6 The practice of
submitting arguments to the court utilizing an interdisciplinary
approach to legal scholarship that incorporates sociological,
statistical, and economic information blossomed after Muller, and
such briefs have come to be known as Brandeis Briefs in honor of the
late justice who pioneered such an integrative view of the lawyer's
quest for truth.67
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis argues for the increased use of
such legislative facts6 in the judicial context, noting "[t]hat
59. See generally supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
60. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
61. See id. at 494 n.11; Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive
Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 400 (1988). In a footnote accompanying this text,
Hovenkamp notes that the Court, in 1917, received "a 200-page social science brief on
race discrimination, but did not refer to it in its opinion" in Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S.
60 (1917). Id. at 400 n.109 (citing Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation before
Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 657-63). Hovenkamp also notes the Court's reliance upon
Brandeis Briefs in both Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908) and Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 559-60 (1923), although the court did not cite to the non-
statutory sources in these briefs. Id.
62. d.
63. 244 U.S. 590, 597 (1917). Justice Brandeis's dissent in Adams cited both law
review articles and a social science journal. See id. at 605 n.6 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(citing W.M. Leiserson, Public Employment Offices, 29 POL. SCI. Q. 36 (1914)); id. at 613-
15 nn.21-25 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing several articles in the American Labor
Legislation Review).
64. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
65. Id. at 419-21.
66. See id at 419.
67. Donald L. Burnett, Jr., The Brandeis Vision, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 1, 5 (1998) (citing
Philippa Strum, Brandeis and the Living Constitution, in BRANDEIS AND AMERICA 120
(Nelson L. Dawson ed., 1989)).
68. Professor Davis, in his now famous article, distinguished between adjudicative
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53
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fundamental procedure (of working with those affected by
government decisions) is tending to become the essence of
democratic §overnment on complex issues, except when courts are
lawmakers." ' Davis goes on to criticize courts as the new legislative
bodies, blindly creating law, "often, without a factual base."70
Reliance upon legislative facts7' in the form of scientific studies
would not present a radical break from tradition for the Court. Since
its 1954 ruling in Brown,72 the Court has relied upon scientific
evidence in a range of cases,73 using such information to support
decisions including those limiting States' authority to regulate
abortions' and mandating a minimum jury size.' Nevertheless,
reliance on social scientific evidence seems unlikely, given the current
limitations on the use of such research.
C. Is Justice Blind?
In Craig v. Boren,76 Justice Brennan expressed the judiciary's
tenuous relationship with science when he stated that "[i]t is
unrealistic to expect... members of the judiciary... to be well versed
in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique."' Professor
David Faigman argues that there has been no improvement in the
Court's understanding of scientific method in the past 25 years.
Justice Powell has admitted that "[m]y understanding of statistical
analysis.., ranges from limited to zero." '79 Professor Faigman
succinctly identified the long-term effect of the Court's approach
facts, those facts associated vith information in the record, and legislative facts, outside
information relevant to a particular situation. See Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to
Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402 (1942).
Although Professor Davis wrote about the administrative process, his terms present a
close fit with the experience of presenting scientific research beyond the scope of the
record to assist judges with questions of law and policy.
69. Kenneth Culp Davis, The William B. Lockhart Lecture, in Judicial, Legislative,
and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71
MINN. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986).
70. Id.
71. See supra note 68.
72. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73. Professor David Faigman notes that Brown "marks the modem era of the Court's
explicit use of scientific research in constitutional law." FAIGMAN, supra note 49, at 101
(citing John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L REV. 477,483-84 (1986)).
74. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
75. Ballew v. Georgia, 438 U.S. 223 (1978).
76. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
77. Id. at 204.
78. FAIGMAN, supra note 49, at 101.
79. Id at 118.
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when he stated that "persistent misapplication of empirical data
undermines the Court's legitimacy."'
Thankfully, the use of expert witness testimony about memory
"is becoming more and more common" in the United States.
Nevertheless, one practitioner has pointed out that although some
courts are slowly beginning to admit expert testimony on eyewitness
identification, most courts are likely to rule that such testimony is
inadmissible.' Others disagree, however, and suggest that "the body
of knowledge upon which eyewitness expert testimony is predicated
more than meets the criteria for admissibility set forth in Daubert.'
Even if the Court refuses to rely on the scientific evidence on
eyewitness identification and mandate sequential lineups, juries are
increasingly likely to learn of the potential for error in eyewitness
testimony.
MI. Due Process
Both the 5th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution
guarantee that no person shall be deprived "of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." A discussion of the proper
scope of the Due Process Clauses, however, requires an inquiry into
the history and evolution of the term "due process." A close
80. Id. at 116.
81. AINSWORTH, supra note 13, at 4.
82. See James M. Doyle, No Confidence: A Step Toward Accuracy in Eyewitness
Trials, THE CHAMPION, Feb. 1998, at 12-13 (noting that "hostility to expert testimony on
eyewitness identification remains strong") (citing United States v. Labanstat, 94 F.3d 527
(9th Cir. 1996)(denying defendant public funds for an eyewitness identification expert and
affirming rejection of jury instruction on reliability of eyewitness identification); United
States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996)(finding in-court identification reliable and
affirming exclusion of expert testimony on such identifications)); see also Judges, supra
note 2, at 285. Although Judges fails to cite specific instances of courts excluding expert
testimony regarding problems with eyewitness identification inaccuracies, his observation
accords with that of Doyle, a seasoned trial and appellate attorney and former professor at
Georgetown Law Center. Other writers also describe with particularity the exclusion of
evidence in this field. See, e.g., Steven D. Penrod et al., Expert Psychological Testimony
on Eyewitness Reliability Before and After Daubert: The State of the Law and the Science,
13 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 229, 230-44 (1995) (noting that "the admission of expert
psychological testimony on eyewitness memory appears to be the exception rather than
the rule.").
83. Penrod et al., supra note 82, at 256. Penrod and his colleagues express concern,
though, that Daubert will not have a major impact on decisions regarding the admissibility
of eyewitness expert testimony. Id. at 244. In spite of their concerns for the impact of the
Daubert standard in state court, the New York Court of Appeals recently found expert
testimony regarding eyewitness identifications not to be inadmissible per se. People v.
Lee, 750 N.E.2d 63, 67 (2001) (affirming the decision, though, on grounds that the trial
court subsequently considered a renewed request for the introduction of expert
testimony). See also Contreras, supra note 38 (noting that "most states now allow defense
attorneys to call experts to explain the potential flaws of eyewitness testimony").
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inspection of the philosophical underpinnings of that phrase reveals
its normative claim, thus requiring more than a minimum of
procedural safeguards.
A. Pofitical Philosophy
J.S. Mill's treatise On Liberty begins with a recognition that
"[t]he struggle between Liberty and Authority is the most
conspicuous feature in the portions of history with which we are
earliest familiar." Mill goes on to note that because the theoretical
notion of "self-government" is not necessarily true in practice,
democratic societies have a need to safeguard the rights of under-
represented classes.85 By limiting the power of the federal and state
governments, the Bill of Rights serves as such a safeguard and
provides a foundation for the notions of liberty and justice that the
American people recognize as a birthright.86
In his landmark work A Theory of Justice, John Rawls stated that
"one legal order is more justly administered than another if it more
perfectly fulfills the precepts of the rule of law."'" In his view, the
proper method for laying the foundation of a truly just society is to
require that rules be chosen behind a "veil of ignorance."'s This
theoretical model permits lawmakers to understand the workings of
human societies, but asks them to formulate laws as though they do
not know the positions in society they will inhabit once the rules have
been established. Rawls stated that "[t]he aim (of having people
choose from the original position behind a veil of ignorance) is to use
the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory.' The
Supreme Court would serve the American public well by grounding
its view of justice in such an idealized, albeit abstract, world.
Continuing his treatment of justice, Rawls states that "[o]ne kind
of unjust action is the failure of judges and others in authority to
apply the appropriate rule or to interpret it correctly."'  Although
Rawls clarifies that this statement relates to "regularity" as a
necessary element of justice,9' his explanation should not be
interpreted to ignore the normative aspect of judicial decisionmaking
because it requires judges to choose the "appropriate rule" to apply.
84. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, in THREE ESSAYS 5 (Oxford University Press
1975) (1859).
85. Id. at 8-9.
86. The pledge of allegiance, for instance, notes that the flag of the United States
represents a republic "vith liberty and justice for all."
87. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 236 (2d prtg. 1972).
88. Id. at 12.
89. Id. at 136 (emphasis added).




Given the veil of ignorance that Rawls would impose on those who
create rules, it is safe to presume that the "appropriate rule" in the
procedural context would be the most accurate of the available
procedures.
Rawls characterizes due process as "a process reasonably
designed to ascertain the truth .... ,"' In spite of his use of the legally
murky term "reasonably," Rawls' description of due process, taken in
conjunction with his earlier statements about justice, suggests the
relative injustice of a legal system that utilizes procedures known to
be less accurate than others. Because sequential lineups are more
accurate, their use would "more perfectly fulfill[] the precepts of the
rule of law." Therefore, the failure to utilize sequential lineups
delivers a process at odds with philosophical notions of what is "due."
B. The American History of Due Process
The state police powers "were not included in the grants of
power to the general government, and therefore were reserved to the
states when the Constitution was ordained."' State laws that conflict
with the Constitution, however, are invalid under the Supremacy
Clause." Because the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is
directed toward the federal government, the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause serves as the basis for much of the
criminal procedure jurisprudence because criminal law traditionally
lay within the sphere of local authority.9 6
(1) A Venerable Pedigree
It is difficult to pinpoint the precise intention behind the
insertion of the due process clause into the Fourteenth Amendment,
much less the earlier Fifth Amendment." One scholar has traced the
roots of the phrase "due process of law" back to the 14th Century
statute 28 Edward III." The Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he
words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the
92. Id. at 239.
93. Id. at236.
94. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540,558 (1902).
95. Id.
96. See U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School
Zones Act). The Court in Lopez rejected the theory that the Commerce Clause granted
Congress carte blanche with respect to criminal law when it limited federal authority
under the clause to cover "action which 'substantially affects' interstate commerce." Id.
97. HORACE EDGAR FLACK PH.D., THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 66-67 (Peter Smith 1965) (1908).
98. See Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law before the Civil War,




same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,'9 in [the] Magna
Charta. Lord Coke, in his commentary on those words, (2 Inst. 50,)"
says they mean due process of law."'' Edward Corwin's research into
the evolution of the Due Process Clauses notes that both phrases
were intended "to consecrate certain methods of trial.'""n In his
seminal work, Democracy and Distrust, John Hart Ely echoed this
sentiment when he stated that "the proper function of the Due
Process Clause [is] that of guaranteeing fair procedures.""
In his treatise on constitutional law, published
contemporaneously with the ratification of the 14th Amendment,
Thomas Cooley suggested that "due process of law" supported a
range of definitions "so various that some difficulty arises in fixing
upon one which shall be accurate, complete in itself, and at the same
time applicable to all cases.""' Cooley cited the definition Daniel
Webster gave for "the law of the land" in his presentation in the
Dartmouth College Case: "[b]y the law of the land is most clearly
intended the general law, which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The
meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society."'0 5 Cooley's broad description of the notion of due process at
the ratification of the 14th Amendment, with its guarantee of the
"protection of the general rules which govern society," provides
persuasive evidence that the words "due process of law" were meant
to guarantee something more than a minimum of procedural fairness.
(2) History Unfolds
For almost seventy years after the ratification of the 14th
Amendment in 1868, the Court adhered to a view of due process that
guaranteed freedom of contract." During this period, the Court
99. "per legem terrae"
100. 1 E. COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
50-51 (1642).
101. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,276 (1855).
102. CORWIN, supra note 98, at 114.
103. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 19 (1980).
104. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION 353 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1868).
105. I& at 353-54 (citing Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518,
581 (1819); 5 DANIEL WEBSTER, THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 487 (Boston, Little
& Brown 1851).
106. This period is often referred to as "the Lochner Era" in reference to the leading
decision embodying this judicial philosophy in which the Court invalidated a New York
law that limited the number of hours a baker could work each week to sixty. Lochner v.
March 2002]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
struck down legislation aimed at combating perceived errors in the
free market system including laws covering everything from minimum
wages"° to price regulations." s As industrialization and urbanization
began to be felt throughout society during the early part of the 20th
Century, however, such an idealized view of the free market system
became increasingly strained. In his famous critique of the Court's
reasoning, Justice Holmes stated that "[t]he 14th Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics."' 9 With its ruling in
West Coast Hotel in 1937, the Court abandoned this lassiez faire
approach to economic regulation and began scrutinizing economic
regulations under the deferential rational basis standard."'
Although the Court long ago discarded the notion that Due
Process guarantees economic rights, modem Due Process
jurisprudence continues to ground a wide range of substantive rights
in the Due Process Clause. Relying on notions of privacy and
autonomy, the Court has recognized the right to marital sexual
intimacy,"' abortion," to freely choose one's familial living
arrangements,"' and more recently, the right to be free from the
arbitrary imposition of excessive damage judgments in civil
litigation."4 Although there is little agreement among scholars as to
the proper scope of substantive due process rights, scholars readily
agree that the Due Process Clause guarantees a minimum level of
procedural fairness. Cooley's broad definition of due process,"'
contemporaneous with the passage of the 14th Amendment, however,
supports a broader reading of the notion of due process than this
minimal threshold.
New York, 198 U.S. 45,46 (1905).
107. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
108. Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929).
109. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J. dissenting). In the same paragraph, Justice
Holmes noted that "a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory." Id. These statements demonstrate the tension that exists between a legal system
based in text and precedent and the rapidly evolving American society when one
remembers Justice Holmes' statement of not ten years before that "the man of the future
is the man of statistics and the master of economics." See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457,469 (1897).
110. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379,381 (1937).
111. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
112. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (noting, however, that the right to terminate a
pregnancy is not absolute and that the state may impose limitations or restrictions on this
right). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1992) (easing judicial
scrutiny of states' limitations on abortion and shifting its emphasis from a basis in the right
to privacy to a basis in the notions of bodily integrity and autonomy).
113. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
114. BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
115. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53
EYEWITNESS LINEUP PROCEDURES
(3) Justice On Our Side?
The Court has recognized the "vagaries of eyewitness
identification," stating that "the annals of criminal law are rife with
instances of mistaken identification. 1 16 In U.S. v. Wade, the Court
discussed the problems with suggestive identification procedures, with
eyewitnesses solidifying their memories based on a pre-trial lineup
selection, and with the inability to reconstruct the identification
procedure accurately at trial.117 After noting that lineups constituted
"a process attended with hazards of serious unfairness to the criminal
accused," the court found eyewitness lineups to be a "critical stage"
of a criminal prosecution, requiring the presence of counsel.1 8
Although Wade relied on the Sixth Amendment and not the Due
Process clause, the decision in Wade recognizes the need to
implement unbiased processes to ensure the fairness and accuracy of
criminal trials. Moreover, because the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel only attaches once formal charges have been brought against
a criminal defendant,"9 a defendant must rely on the Due Process
clause when challenging the integrity of a pre-indictment eyewitness
line-up. 20
In Simmons v. U.S.," the Court announced that the use of a
procedure "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification" would violate
an accused's Due Process rights.' In Foster v. California,' the Court
found a due process violation in a series of suggestive lineup
confrontations. In general, however, defendants' claims of overly-
116. U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228 (1967) (citing BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE
INNOCENT; FRANK & FRANK, NOT GUILTY; WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IN
CRIMINAL CASES; 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 786a (3d ed. 1940); ROLPH, PERSONAL
IDENTITY; GROSS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 47-54 (Jackson ed., 1962); WILLIAMS,
PROOF OF GUILT 83-98 (1955); WILLS, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 192-205 (7th ed.
1937); WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 250-253 (3d ed. 1937)).
117. Id at 228-31.
118. d at 234.
119. Kirby v. Ill., 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). Although the Court declined the extension
of Wade to pre-indictment lineups in Kirby, one article has noted that the political
restructuring of the Court during the Nixon administration was ultimately responsible for
the reversal of the Court's earlier, but unissued, opinion extending Wade to pre-indictment
lineups. Craig M. Bradley & Joseph L. Hoffmann, "Be Careful What You Ask For". The
2000 Presidential Election, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 76
IND. L.J. 889, 892 n.13 (2001) (citing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED
OPINIONS OF THE BURGER COURT 63-64 (1988)).
120. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977) ("The standard, after all, is that of
fairness as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
121. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
122. Id at 384.
123. 394 U.S. 440,442 (1969).
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suggestive identification procedures have failed." Moreover, the
opinion in Simmons limited the general applicability of cases finding
due process violations when it proclaimed that "each case must be
considered on its own facts."'"
In this area, however, the Court cannot accept a substitute for
the most accurate procedure and continue to declare such a
procedure fair. Because the Court in U.S. v. Ash 116 held that suspects
do not have a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present when
witnesses look at photographic lineups or during pre-indictment
lineups, there is a particular need to employ the procedure known to
be most accurate to counter any suggestive police behavior that may
occur outside of the watchful eye of defense counsel. Only by doing
so will justice be served.
IV. A New Mode
A. Giant Steps
Despite the fact that few law enforcement agencies have reacted
to the considerable body of research in the area of eyewitness
identifications and lineup procedures, the research has not gone
unnoticed. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has publicly stated
that "[s]cientific research indicates that identification procedures such
as lineups and photo arrays produce more reliable evidence when the
individual lineup members or photographs are shown to the witness
sequentially-once at a time-rather than simultaneously."' '  The
DOJ does not marginalize the research by describing it as "social
science" research. In describing the research as "scientific," the DOJ
has taken an essential step in equating psychological research with
what has traditionally been termed the "hard" sciences." Despite its
124. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196-98 (1972) (citing Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293,
301-02 (1967) (finding no due process violation in identification based on the 'totality of
the circumstances'); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968) (affirming
admission of identification based on photo lineup procedure); Foster v. California, 394
U.S. 440, 442 (1969) (finding a succession of suggestive lineup confrontations to have
violated defendant's due process); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 (1970) (admitting
an in-court identification by witness who had a fleeting look at the suspect in the
headlights of a passing car)).
125. 390 U.S. at 384.
126. 413 U.S. 300, 321 (1973). The Court in Ash declined to consider the question of
whether the photographic display violated the defendant's due process rights under the
Simmons standard. Id.
127. NAT'L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE:
A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 9 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter DOJ GUIDE].
128. After the Court's decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999),
the trial judge's "gatekeeper" function under Daubert applies to all expert testimony, and
the distinction has less significance for the purposes of litigation.
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recognition of the value of sequential lineups, the DOJ's Guide states
that there is no preferred manner for conducting lineups and
explicitly states that inclusion of sequential lineup procedures in the
Guide "does not indicate a preference for sequential procedures."'29
Also, significantly, the state of New Jersey has made major
strides toward improving the fairness of its criminal justice system
through more accurate appraisals of eyewitness identification
procedures. First, the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v.
Cromedy" found reversible error in a trial court's refusal to issue a
jury instruction on the possible risks of inaccuracy in cross-racial
identifications when such an "identification is a critical issue in the
case, and an eyewitness's cross-racial identification is not
corroborated by other evidence giving it independent reliability.''
The thorough decision in Cromedy surveyed the extensive literature
in the area of eyewitness identification reliability and drew upon a
range of judicial opinions, scholarly articles, and reports in issuing its
edict.
In another major step toward improving the accuracy of the
criminal justice system, New Jersey Attorney General John Farmer in
April 2001 issued new Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting
Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures ("Guidelines").'
The Guidelines require that "[w]hen possible, photo or live lineup
procedures should be conducted sequentially."'" The memorandum
accompanying the distribution of the Guidelines notes that the
Guidelines:
129. DOJ GUIDE, supra note 127, at 9.
130. 727 A.2d 457,467 (N.J. 1999).
131. Id. Although future cases have declined to expand the scope of the decision in
Cromedy, see, e.g., State v. Valentine, 785 A.2d 940, 941 (finding that Cromedy does not
require a jury instruction regarding cross-ethnic identifications), these cases do not
undercut the importance of the court's decision nor do they undermine the research upon
which the decision in Cromedy is based.
132. N.J. DEPT OF LAW AND PUBLIC SAFETY, OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL,
GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING PHOTO AND LIVE LINEUP
IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES, April 18, 2001 [hereinafter N.J. GUIDELINES], available
at psych-server.iastate.edu/faculty/gwells/homepage.htm.
133. Id. at 1. In cases where sequential lineups are impracticable, the Guidelines
provide procedures to reduce the suggestiveness of the procedure. Id at 3-6. The
Guidelines also recommend that agencies "utilize ... someone other than the primary
investigator assigned to a case to conduct both photo and live lineup identifications ... to
avoid any inadvertent body signals or cues to witnesses... [which] occur when the identity
of the actual suspect is known to the individual conducting the identification procedure."
Memorandum from the NJ. Dept of Law and Public Safety, Office of the Attorney
General, Re: Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup
Identification Procedures 1-2 (April 18, 2001) [hereinafter Guidelines Memo] available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edulfaculty/gwells/njguidelines.pdf.
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which incorporate more than 20 years of scientific research on
memory and interview techniques, will improve the eyewitness
identification process in New Jersey to ensure that the criminal
justice system will fairly and effectively elicit accurate and reliable
eyewitness evidence.... With these Guidelines, New Jersey will
become the first state in the Nation to officially adopt the
recommendations issued by the [DOJ].M
In an effort to speed up the "steep learning curve" required to
implement the new procedures, 35 the Attorney General's office
sponsored hundreds of training sessions on the new Guidelines and
New Jersey police agencies began to implement the new procedures
on October 15, 2001.136 One New Jersey police chief noted that the
procedures did not present a major inconvenience, and other
departments have taken steps to improve upon the basic procedure
the Guidelines offer. 37 In light of the relatively painless experience in
New Jersey, other jurisdictions have little justification for dragging
their feet in adopting sequential lineup procedures.'
B. The Logical Progression
The Court should acknowledge what researchers in the area take
for granted and what law enforcement agencies are beginning to
recognize: sequential lineups increase predictive accuracy in
eyewitness identifications over the levels achieved through traditional
lineup procedures with little or no additional effort required on the
part of law enforcement officials. The New York Supreme Court
recently ordered the Department of Corrections to conduct a double
blind sequential lineup in one case, noting the unanimity of opinion in
the scientific community that sequential lineups are better in terms of
accuracy and fairness. 3 In his opinion, Justice Robert S. Kreindler
noted that "[tihe additional inconvenience of requiring law
enforcement agents to conduct a double blind sequential lineup
rather than a simultaneous lineup is minimal if not non-existent."'4
134. Guidelines Memo, supra note 133, at 1.
135. Id. at 3.
136. William Kleinknecht, Mugshot Rule Is Changed to One at a Time, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, Oct. 15,2001, available at 2001 WL 28898898.
137. Id
138. The research hasn't convinced everybody, however. One article has noted that
South Florida law enforcement agencies will not be implementing the procedures adopted
in New Jersey in spite of two recent high-profile cases involving convictions overturned
based on DNA evidence, one of which relied heavily on eyewitness identification. See
Nancy L. Othon, Florida Retains Witness Routine Side-by-Side Photo Identification to Stay,
FLORIDA SUN SENTINEL, Aug. 13,2001 at 1B, available at 2001 WL 22749074.
139. In re Investigation of Thomas, 733 N.Y.S.2d 591, 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
140. Id at 596.
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C. A Dissonant Chord
Although the Court in Neil v. Biggers acknowledged that the
reason for finding suggestive identification procedures violative of
due process was that they increase the likelihood of
misidentification,' it is unlikely that the Court would extend this
logic beyond a case-specific inquiry into a general critique of
simultaneous line-ups in the wake of its decision in McClesky v.
Kemp.' In McClesky, a black defendant appealed to the court on the
basis that his death sentence violated both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Eighth's Amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment because of unequal applications of the death
penalty among defendants.'43 McClesky's claim was based on the
Baldus study, a remarkably sophisticated'" study that uncovered
racial disparities in the application of the death penalty in Georgia.'
In spite of the Court's acknowledgement of the scope of the study and
the apparently stark evidence of unequal applications of the death
penalty, the Court ruled against McClesky on the grounds that there
was no proof "that race was a factor in McClesky's particular case."'46
Under this application, studies demonstrating general inaccuracies in
procedures will never amount to anything more than interesting
information for the court to acknowledge and promptly dismiss.4
Conclusion
Perhaps the Court's reluctance to ground its decisions in the
science of the day demonstrates a vanity that is not unjustified in light
of the history of the evolution of knowledge. No one wishes to
appear foolish to one's progeny. Today, few, if any, scientists would
argue, as Louis Brandeis did with his brief in Muller, that men and
women's physical differences mandate different treatment in the
workplace. Likewise, the science of eugenics upon which Justice
Holmes based his decision for the court in Buck v. Bell'" is farthest
from fashion among those who consider themselves to be well-
141. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 198.
142. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
143. Id at 286.
144. The Court itself referred to the study as "actually two sophisticated statistical
studies that examine over 2,000 murder cases." Id
145. Id. at 286-87.
146. Id at 297.
147. Professor David Faigman has commented that the Court's holding in McClesky
"that the Eighth Amendment required a particularized showing of discrimination in the
petitioner's own case... rendered the statistical proof irrelevant." FAIGMAN, supra note
49, at 117.
148. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (Holmes, J.) (stating that "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough").
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educated. Few would dismiss outright, however, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis's contributions to the history of jurisprudence on the basis
of their reliance upon the thoughts of their day in their work. Rather,
these opinions' flaws demonstrate that the quest for truth evolves
with humankind's ability to frame the inquiry, to investigate, and,
ultimately, to ascertain the truth. Justice Cardozo believed that a
judge should draw at least partly on "his study of the social sciences"
in the process of legal reasoning.'49 Cardozo noted, however, that
"[s]ociology would petrify with a rigidity more fatal than that of logic,
or rather, with a logic of its own, if its hypothesis were treated as
finalities. 'The problem,' in the words of [John] Dewey, 'is one of
continuous, vital redemption.". 50  In spite of the difficulty in
identifying, let alone hitting, the moving target of scientific progress,"'
courts must not shrink from their task of recognizing scientific truths
when presented with them.
To banish scientific advancements from the realm of
constitutional law is to ground the narrative of constitutional
jurisprudence in myth and to shroud the people's fate in mystery.
Moreover, a lack of willingness to base its decisions in well-supported
scientific research supports the perception that the Court's opinions
are nothing more than just that: the opinions of a group of nine
people assembled under the guise of law. Courts need not engage in
a battle of experts. To do so would equally undermine the prestige of
the judiciary and further politicize, or at least create an air of
politicking about, the struggle to determine the law of the land. But
when widely accepted scientific evidence supports the proposition
that one process is more accurate than another, the Court does itself
and all citizens a great injustice in accepting that anything less than
the best is "due."
This note presents a case for a normative view of the Due
Process Clause that would require the Court to rely upon widely
accepted research in finding inadequate "process of law" in current
approaches to eyewitness identification procedures. In the end, it is
ironic that social scientific research seems destined to be relegated to
a mere footnote in the annals of constitutional jurisprudence. A
149. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 85-86 (1924).
150. Id- at 85 (quoting JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDuCr 240 (1922)).
151. Judge William Schwarzer has noted the difficulty judges face in distinguishing
scientific theory from fact, but warns people not to forget the burden of proof and the
simple fact that that "judges-and juries-are not charged with determining the absolute
truth of scientific propositions, or of anything else." William W. Schwarzer, Encounter in
the Courtroom: Federal Judges Meet Science, available at Westlaw, C554 ALI-ABA 155.
For further discussion of the integration of the evolving body of scientific knowledge into




system lacking in self-critical appraisal of the fairness of its
procedures will fail to deliver a just result. Moreover, to treat as
equal those which are plainly unequal, rather than evaluating each
according to merit, 2 is to give injustice the imprimatur of law.
152. See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Bk. V, Ch. 3.
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